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We look at Paul A. Samuelson’s 1958 article “An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With or Without
the Social Contrivance of Money” as an exemplary, Neo-classically misconstructed model of nowadays society
and its economic activities. The failure to notice the existence of unpaid labor in the framework of the model,
and the implicit dependence of the outcomes on unpaid (omitted) reproduction work has apparently gone un-
challenged so far. The logical inconsistencies of the model and their androcentric backgrounds are discussed in
this paper. Furthermore, we aim to debate (but not explicitly formulate) an alternative modeling approach based
on the use of Genetic Algorithms to include – at least some – crucial features of modern society in its whole
heterogenity.
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On the one hand, Paul Samuelson’s 1958 article
“An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With
or Without the Social Contrivance of Money” appears
to be a paradigmatic misconstruction of nowadays
society and its economic activities, but on the other
hand, it is still the uncriticized core of numerous
economic theories in various fields. Men as Hobbe-
sian Mushrooms, Robinson-Crusoe-Individuals, and
Mother Earth are the agents populating Samuelson’s
analogy. Though often challenged, e.g. by Hahn and
Solow (1995), Samuelson’s overlapping generations
(OLG) model also explains the basics of monetary
theory and social contrivance. The androcentric bias
in Samuelson’s assumptions leads to partially bizarre
results which have apparently gone unchallenged so
far. Among these assumptions are (1) the failure to
acknowledge the existence of unpaid labor in the
framework of the OLG model, and (2) the fact that
the model outcomes implicitly depend on the (unpaid)
“reproduction work” (of women). The logical incon-
sistencies in the assumption-output relations – in
contrast to the wide recognition of Samuelson’s OLG
model – are discussed in this paper.
1.   THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT FOR AN
APPROACH TO SAMUELSON’S OLG MODEL
1.1  DEFINITION OF THE BASIC KEYWORDS
The critique of the OLG model presented in this pa-
per is based on a feminist background1, and the
awareness of androcentric2 biases inherent in the
model. We focus on the social inequalities between
                                         
1 “... common to virtually all feminist views [...] is the belief
that women are subordinated to men to a degree that is
morally wrong and unnecessary.” (England, 1993).
2 The term androcentric refers to a system of any sort,
where everything is related to men.
men and women from a gender3 point of view rather
than explaining the occurrence of unpaid work via the
existence of (possibly racist) wage discrimination –
extending to slavery4-like conditions, i.e. working
conditions of illegal immigrants or prisoners in pri-
vate detention centers.
1.2  THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST RATES AND THE
ORIGINS OF MECHANICAL BELIEFS
The origins of the use of interest rates are closely
related to the invention of devices to measure time. If
a society does not keep track of time, interest rates are
without any meaning. With the invention of mechani-
cal clocks around 1300 AD, mechanical concepts
have become characteristic for natural as well as for
socio-economic sciences.5 Nowadays, the principle of
interest rates is usually not questioned, on the con-
trary, it seems to be one of the most normal concepts
of everyday life. Students are trained to cope with
them in school, the influence of interest payments on
private investment acts as source of joy (or threat),
and the government’s indebtedness may bring wealth
or poverty to its citizens. Note that nonetheless, a
                                         
3 “Gender, as the word is used by many feminists, means
something quite different from biological sex. Gender is the
social meaning given to biological differences between the
sexes; it refers to cultural constraints rather than to bio-
logical givens.” (Ferber and Nelson, 1993).
4 Notions of racism imbedded in rational economic theory
lay for example in the use of Robinson Crusoe’s persona as
an anchor for the agents populating Samuelson’s modeled
world (see Grapard, 1995).
5 The belief in mechanics as the most successful approach
to science is meanwhile widely challenged by feminist
scientists in almost all fields of research. E.g. Wertheim
(1997) describes physics as a male dominated religious
clique, and relates the witch hunts in Europe and the de-
struction of wise women’s wisdom during the Middle-ages
to the boom of mechanistic sciences.
2prevailing strain in economic theory aims at ex-
plaining and legitimizing the phenomenon of using
interest rates. E.g., Samuelson (1958) defines interest
rates as the “intertemporal terms of trade between
generations”. They will spring up spontaneously in
ideally competitive markets.
1.3  THE DIFFICULTIES OF MATHEMATICAL MODELING
Closely intertwined with the origins of all modern
sciences (and the belief in mechanics) is the tech-
nique of mathematical modeling, a tool which is
excessively used to describe the generations’ interac-
tions in Samuelson’s model. Whenever we set up a
mathematical model of a real world process, we have
to pay particular attention to the fact whether the
aspired features of real world behavior carry over to
the mathematical model which is subject to restric-
tions caused by the choice of the methodology – in
terms of Albert Einstein “we should make models as
simple as possible, but not simpler”. Since these
limitations caused by the choice of methodology do
not only restrict the model’s input, but also the
model’s output, it is essential for further discussion to
be aware of the degree of real world’s alienation due
to the modeling procedure. Note that “he information
we omit from our stories reveals as much, if not more,
of our values and beliefs than the information we
choose to include.” (Grapard, 1995). Symptomati-
cally, this applies, in particular, as soon as we attempt
to involve the principle of value into a mathematical
modeling approach.
1.4   THE THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (AND LABOR)
Economics was (and still is) regarded as the “science
of rational choice”. With respect to scarce resources
individuals are supposed to maximize their utility
(and/or minimize their pain) in a rational way. These
rational optimality decisions are treated like scientific
laws (Samuelson, 1947), and, hence, economics may
be regarded as a physical-mathematical science (Wal-
ras, 1881). Relying on the theory of rational choice,
the models used to describe the phenomenons of
physical mechanics are often precisely copied and
applied to economic problems (using the identical
mathematical approaches) – “Under the assumption
that mathematics is based on geometry, geometrical
rules can be applied to situations in economics.”
(Debreu, 1959).
The majority of rational decisions in economic life
arise from the demand for labor in order to satisfy the
desire for consumption. Labor is related to its utility
and the value or wage, respectively, associated with
it. Traditionally, economists view labor as painful
experience. Adam Smith (1778) defines labor as an
activity which forces a worker to give up “his tran-
quility, his freedom and his happiness”. Charlotte
Perkins Gilman (1964) links “that pitiful conception
of labor as a curse to the very old and androcentric
habit of despising it as belonging to women and then
to slaves. [...] Our current teachings of the infant
science of political economy are naively masculine.
They assume as unquestionably that the “economic
man” will never do anything unless he has to; will
only do it to escape pain or attain pleasure; and will
inevitably take all he can get and do all he can to
outwit, overcome, and if necessary destroy his an-
tagonist”. Samuelson’s consumption-loan model of
interest perfectly mirrors this belief and the basic
features of mechanical thinking. We will try to ex-
tract these “mechanical beliefs”, their consequences,
and their applications, from the implicit assumptions
of Samuelson’s OLG model –  since these beliefs are
used as an instrumentality of the justification of op-
pression and exploitation of women (or slaves) deeply
rooted within them.
2.   SAMUELSON’S OLG MODEL AND ITS
CURRENT APPLICATIONS IN ECONOMICS
In his famous 1958 paper Paul A. Samuelson intends
to develop equilibrium conditions for lifetime con-
sumption-saving patterns determined by the market
interest rates in a society of rational consumers. Act-
ally, Samuelson seeks to explain the survival of a
single group of (currently) non-productive agents in
an ideally competitive world. As a pioneer in this
field of research, Samuelson develops a brand new
model including “some interesting mathematical
boundary problems, a little like those in the modern
theories of dynamic programming” (Samuelson,
1958), and he contributes to the current theories of
money and interest. But beyond these clearly specified
issues a hidden agenda influences the choice of the
assumptions, of the methodology, and, finally, of the
outcomes of the mathematical analysis of Samuel-
son’s OLG model.
Figure 1 seeks to visualize Samuelson’s construc-
tion, i.e. its explicit and its implicit assumptions (ex-
plained in detail in Section 3), its conclusions (dis-
cussed in Sections 3 and 4), and their relations among
each other. Additionally, the diagram shows a few
extensions of the last decades to adapt and to improve
the model’s fit to real-world behavior.
Though Samuelson’s article was published more
than 40 years ago, still each economist working in the
field of intertemporary interactions (between genera-
tions) seems to stumble over Samuelson’s OLG
model, because the application of this model emerges
in various areas – ranging from the most obvious ones
like retirement contribution systems, social policies,
taxation, income distribution, financial and monetary
theory to environmental economics, and economics of
war and peace, see e.g. Bommier and Lee (1995),
Brunner (1997, 1999), Galor (1989), Goenka and
Spear (1994), John et al. (1993), Koskela and Ol-
likainen (1998), Macher et al. (1999), Manne (1999),
McCallum (1983), Nishimura and Shimomura
(1997), Pingle and Tesfation (1993), Raut (1989),
Rutherford (1999), Spiegel (1998), Wallace (1978),
Weizsäcker (1996) to mention only some of them.
3Figure 1: Samuelson’s modeled world including extensions to his assumptions.
OUTCOMES OF THE OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL (SAMUELSON, 1958)
Samuelson’s final conclusions, after his mathematical approach of regarding the dilemma of the
collision between the desire for consumption in retirement and the inability to store remains of
former production, come to form following statements:
· “Every geometrically growing consumption-loan economy has an equilibrium market rate of
interest exactly equal to its biological percentage growth rate.” (Samuelson, 1958), i.e. in ab-
sence of capital the output is merely determined by the number of workers – which explains the
importance of human reproduction.
· The biological market interest rates are related to growth, but are not socially optimal.
· The invisible hand will install money as an institution to achieve a socially optimal biological
interest rate configuration. Money becomes an invention of a social arrangement to store
wealth, optimize saving and consumption in productive periods, reach pareto-efficient out-
comes, and to guarantee optimal old age benefits (Samuelson, 1958).
EXPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS OF THE OVERLAPPING
GENERATIONS MODEL (SAMUELSON, 1958)
A1 All agents in the model are supposed to behave uni-
formly over time, with identical preferences regard-
ing their consumption behavior and with identical
production capacities.
A2 All agents live equally long. The birth rate is as-
sumed to be geometrically growing with respect to
the magnitude of the labor force (or constant).
A3 Life is divided into 3 periods, where the first two
periods are devoted to work and the last period is
spent in retirement. This leaves us with the young
workers (20–42), the middle aged workers (42–65)
and the aged people in retirement (65–80). Note that
children (up to the age of 20) “are part of their par-
ents’ consumption, and we take no note of them”
(Samuelson, 1958).
A4 The economic agents produce one unit of a good
when they are young workers, one unit of the good
when they are middle-aged workers, and nothing at
all when they are retired.
A5 The good produced has a constant price and is as-
sumed to be renewable but not storable at all. Com-
munity’s total net saving per period equals zero.
A6 Absence of comprehensive social security.
A7 The time horizon is regarded to be infinite.
A8 Negation of Boehm-Bawerk’s (1924) three causes:
1. Society doesn’t get more prosperous over time
2. Time-preference is non systematic
3. Technological progress is non existent
A9 Markets are ideally competitive; Neo-Walrasian
concept of a general competitive equilibrium (Wal-
ras, 1881).
A10 Non-slave economy.
EXTENSIONS TO SAMUELSON´S
ASSUMPTIONS
Ø allowing non-identical individu-
als, e.g. Arifovic (1995, 1996),
Dawid (1996), Bullard and
Duffy (1998),
Ø introducing irregular mortality
patterns, e.g. Rutherford (1999),
Ø including different views about
children’s consumption, e.g. Ro-
senzweig and Wolpin (1994),
Ø i troducing the existence of fiat
money, e.g. Wallace (1978),
Ø restricting to a finite time
framework, e.g. John et al.
(1993), Bommier and Lee
(1995),
Ø allowing imperfect markets, e.g.
Hahn and Solow (1995).
IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS
A11 All agents in the model are of
male gender.
A12 Women are part of the male
individuals´ consumption.
A13 The modeled economy in-
cludes the unpaid labor of
women in non-market do-
mains.
A14 The number of females in the
modeled economy leaves the
birth rate unaffected.
A15 Value depends on scarcity
4The OLG model, however, is not only used as a major
requisite in most economists’ toolkit, it also serves as
a rigid philosophical framework for economic and
political activities in mainstream economics, e.g. new
classical economists, like Gary Becker, are still
building their theories on the dogmatic opinions
stemming from Samuelson-like models. The difficul-
ties arising from this traditional (ab)use of exclusively
male economic theories as propaganda instruments to
strengthen male advantages combined with the naive
gender-blindness inherent in such models, often lead
to logical dead-ends and paradoxes in the model out-
comes. This is why we carefully have to answer the
question whether or not Samuelson’s analogy is an
appropriate and, especially, a technically correct
reflection of real-world behavior – particularly of
nowadays real-world behavior.
3.   THE HIDDEN AGENDA IN SAMUELSON’S
OLG MODEL
3.1  THE ECONOMIC AGENTS’ GENDER (ASSUMPTION A11)
A major bifurcation in the logical motivation of the
overlapping generations model already arises due to
Samuelson’s (1958) first assumption,
“... men enter the labor market at about the age
of twenty ...”
Does men stand for male persons only or does Sa-
muelson refer to the second meaning of the word men
which includes all humans in a common manhood?
This distinction between the corresponding scenarios
is absolutely necessary, since the very essence of the
model, and all its implications have to be looked at
differently in either way.
Let us assume that Samuelson was indeed taking
an inclusive approach, referring to men and women
by the use of the term “men”. Then men and women
are considered to have identical production patterns
and identical possibilities according to assumption
A1. They produce identical goods, get paid identical
wages, are equally present in the labor market, and
equally share work among both sexes. The birth of a
child, however, is “a women’s job” – and the exis-
tence of children is essential for the outcomes of the
OLG model (see Figure 1). But the time invested into
the so-called “reproduction phase” does not cut back
the labor force at any time. Consequently, either “re-
production work” is assigned a market price which
would be a real innovation and should have caused
some discussions, or women are not included to act as
economic agents in the OLG model.
Furthermore, considering the OLG model in its
historical context -the late 1950ies- one has to admit,
that the “men-and-women-are-identical-individuals-
with-respect-to-labor-and-wages”description of the
labor market (and of society in general) would not
have fit white, middle-class surroundings at all. It
seems unlikely, that Samuelson aimed to model a
situation opposite to the real-life situation he was
facing -especially, according to Robert S low’s opin-
io  (1993) which says that an economist’s (or scien-
t st’s) subjective view of a real-world problem inevi-
tably emerges in the corresponding economic model:
“The economist, in thinking about the economy,
is inevitably thinking about herself or himself.
Introspection plays no part in the framing of hy-
potheses about chemistry or molecular biology,
but I do not see how it can be wholly avoided in
framing hypotheses about economic behavior.”
(Solow, 1993)
Therefore, we can assume that Samuelson was refer-
ring to (male) men only. Then his assumptions with
respect to the agents populating his model make more
sense (though these assumptions are, nonetheless, a
considerable simplification of human behavior): The
(male) individuals amongst each other can be thought
of as “far more identical” than in the previous sce-
nario which tends to satisfy assumption A1. The life
cycles are quite similar, work life starts at around the
age of 20 and is not interrupted till retirement which
fulfils assumption A3. The levels of productivity and
wages are more equal in a group of workers consist-
ing out of men only as outlined by assumption A4;
duties or responsibilities aside from professional labor
are not an issue. But now the role of women in the
context of the OLG model is quite unclear.
3.2 THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SAMUELSON’S OLG
MODEL (ASSUMPTIONS A12–A14)
We know that females have to exist somewhere in the
OLG model, since the existence of children is inevi-
tably ecessary for the outcomes of Samuelson’s
odel – and, indeed, Samuelson does not forget fe-
males as he refers to the importance of the reproduc-
tivity of human mothers (and even “Mother Earth”
herself as a metaphor for fertility). Since the labor
market is not accessible for females according to
Section 3.1, women must be (working) somewhere
lse. But where? If they are “simply at home”, we
have to continue our inquiry: What is their occupa-
tion? Who pays their expenses? Are they – just like
children – part of their parents’ (or husbands’) con-
sumption, and “we take no further note of them”? Do
mothers solely serve as a source for the H bbesian
men6, or are women only existing in the form of chil-
dren and mothers?
                                         
6 “Let us consider men ... as if but even now sprung out of
the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full
5Even though the scenario of excluding women – ac-
cording to assumption A11 – piles up an enormous
amount of questions with respect to the argumenta-
tion in Section 3.1 it still is the one Samuelson had in
mind with respect to his modeling process. This fact
is embarrassing, but not new or special in the field of
economic theory. When trying to explain the different
approaches of “individuals” with respect to their
actions on the free market compared to their altruism
at home, Gary Becker (1995) walks in Adam Smith’s
(1778) boots just like Paul Samuelson by continuing
the Neo-classical tradition of male bias7:
“Every man feels his own pleasures and pains
more sensibly than those of other people. ... After
himself, the members of his own family, those
who usually live in the same house with him, his
parents, his children, his brothers and sisters, are
naturally the objects of his warmest affections.
They are naturally and usually the persons upon
whose happiness or misery his conduct must have
the greatest influence.” (Smith, 1778).
Here, we may witness the typical, symptomatic Ne -
classical blindness for the role and for the status of
women: In the long list of nearest and dearest people
in a man’s household, neither Smith, nor Becker, nor
Samuelson realize that the inclusion of a beloved
partner, and/or wife who cares for her husband’s
physical and emotional needs, and/or a mother of
joint children, and/or a woman who does the house-
work, is not accomplished.
Behind this obvious insufficiency lurks the vehe-
ment discussion whether it is correct to reduce the
agents populating an economic model to the (mathe-
matically tractable) paradigm of the h mo oeconomi-
cus. This construction dates back to John Stuart Mill
(1869), and seeks to describe seemingly objectified
personae, which should create the objectivity needed
by scientists. The concept has been source of a wide
dispute, where the heart of the discussion was the
debate whether the homo oeconomicus is an idealized
picture of human rationality, or a ruthless ego-
maniac. Another interesting controversy arises from
the question, whether this “device for objectivity”
reflects the sexism and racism most economists are
                                                           
maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other”
(Nelson, 1996a). Nowadays the Hobbesian mushroom
theory is replaced by the more popular technocratic ap-
proach of parachuters, who fall from the skies with their
full supplies.
7 Feminists who are criticizing some obvious inequalities,
e.g. discrimination via wages, are constantly facing theo-
retical rationalizations originating from such economic
basics. In order to falsify theories like that, it is indispensa-
ble to look into the reasoning which justified the slip from
the reality which theories sought to portray.
blind for.8 The homo oeconomicus is the personifica-
tion of a white, middle-class male; people less privi-
leg d are not mentioned at all in this context. On the
contrary, as a component of historical tradition (see
e.g. Mies, 1988), these people are regarded as con-
sumption goods rather than as agents, just like it
se ms o be the case in Samuelson’s anal gy.
3.2.1   RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR WOMEN
To exclude women from the modeling process ac-
cording to assumption A11 mirrors the (often) op-
pressive real-life conditions. A practical example is
delivered by the retirement contribution insurance:
The core problem in Samuelson’s modeled world is
the desire of the aged men to consume once they are
retired. To guarantee retirement incomes it is nece-
sary to have worked and produced beforehand.
Women are not mentioned in this context; they are
not even considered as intertemporary trading part-
ners with respect to retirement benefits. This happens
because women, who are not working in the labor
market, but e.g. operating solely as mothers – being
part of their husbands’ consumption which satisfies
assumption A12 – will not produce anything in the
framework of the OLG model. If a housewife’s hus-
band dies after a long marriage she will receive a
retirement income since the insurance has guaranteed
him to care for his wife in case he dies first. But if the
husband leaves his wife after a whole life of hous-
work he will receive his retirement benefits – while
she will not. Just like in Samuelson’s model world the
wife does not exist in the retirement contribution
scheme. Generally, the consumption of “Samuelson’s
women” of any age depends entirely on the altruism
of a male relative as expressed by assumption A12.
3.2.2  WOMEN’S REPRODUCTION WORK
The imperfection of the conditions for women in real
life do s not start in retirement age. Economic theory
dismiss s a whole segment of production, namely the
unpaid reproduction work in the household as out-
lined by assumption A13. The reluctance to acknowl-
edge women’s traditional work results in low wages if
these duties are performed on the labor market, and
in no wages if performed at home. Women and their
work go unnoticed and the value of their work is
disclaimed.9 The fact that women receive lower-level
                                         
8 “There are androcentric biases in the deep theoretical
structure of Neo-classical economics. [...] It presumes that
humans are autonomous, impervious to social influences,
and lack sufficient emotional connection to each other to
make empathy possible [...] in the market. [But] in the
family, individuals (particularly men) are presumed to be
altruistic.” (Mies, 1988).
9 “Men’s interests are furthered because analyses pro-
ceedi g from these [biased] assumptions direct our atten-
tion away from the ways in which typical arrangements
between men and women perpetuate women’s disadvantage
6wages is often justified by the dubious argument that
this is a necessary condition to increase welfare
(Maier, 1993). Diane Elson (1993) points out that,
though (or even because), “economics does not dis-
tinguish between men and women, economics is not
neutral with respect to gender. The overestimation of
the importance of issues like GDP, growth, imports,
exports, optimization of resource allocation, prizes,
and so on, elucidates the male bias in economics”.
The sphere of household and household production is
terribly neglected, even though most economists
should be aware of the fact that (women’s) reproduc-
tion work emerges as the basis of all economic activi-
ties. Economic theories assume implicitly that repro-
duction work is independent of all other economic
activities (so does Samuelson in assumption A13), .e.
reproduction work will always be available to an
extent that ensures that the remaining economic ac-
tivities will never be negatively influenced by a short-
age of production due to reproduction. For instance,
Samuelson simply assumes: “... let us [...] keep births
forever constant.” (Samuelson, 1958). Remarkable,
however, is the fact that the birth rate is completely
independent of the number of women as outlined by
assumption A14. We pay attention to this paradox in
the following section.
3.3 SUMMARIZING THE CHANCES OMITTED FOR
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE OLG MODEL
PERFORMANCE
When Samuelson discovers that interest rates are
related to the growth of the population in the frame-
work of his OLG model the track of ignorance begins:
“I seem to be the first, outside a slave economy to
develop a biological theory of interest relating it to
the reproductivity of human mothers.” (Samuelson,
1958).
Samuelson emphasizes his surprise about his discov-
ery with the words,
“Is there a common-sense market explanation of
this (to me at least) astonishing result?” (Samuelson
1958),
and proceeds to solve the mystery. He finds the
seemingly sufficient explanation that an increment in
the number of younger workers makes the life of the
old more pleasant. Rigorous examination of the
model assumptions and its conclusions, however,
yields a different answer. Instead of sticking to the
dogma, one might follow the two blatant hints arising
from Samuelson’s analysis.
(1) The existence of a biological interest rate already
strongly points towards the source of children
                                                           
both in their families and in labor markets.” (England,
1993).
and the new workers – and Samuelson (1958)
himself realizes and acknowledges that “the in-
terest rate is related to the reproductivity of hu-
man mothers”. Nevertheless, Samuelson relies on
an everlasting constant fertility rate or a birth
rate geometrically growing with the size of the
labor force, respectively. The fact that women –
whose number is exogenously determined, and
who are treated to be outside the modeled labor
force – are at least as important for the determi-
na ion of the birth rate as (working) men are. But
the model assumptions are confusing: Does the
extent of the labor force (A2) determine the birth
rate or is the fertility of women dependent on
their number to keep the population growth con-
stant? (A14)
(2) The second hint comes up when Samuelson adds
the statement to his astonishing discovery about
the relation between interest rates and biological
growth that his results are imbedded in a mod-
eled world “outside a slave economy” according
to assumption A10. This is more than a gentle
push for examining whether there is really no
unpaid work hidden somewhere in the depths of
the unspoken model assumptions – or in other
words, whether a contradiction between explicit
(A10) and implicit (A13) assumptions exists.
Samuelson ignores these hints and sets up the story of
the Hobbesian young men who pay for (and nurse?)
the old. This simplification follows a long tradition,
and is usually regarded with a congenial smile, but it
is essential not to play down this practice.
“Well socialized economists, however, in practice
tend to view their simplifications - especially those
required by the core assumptions of self-interested
individualism and contractual exchange - as rela-
tively innocent. The prevalence of jokes about
economists forgetting that assumptions are just as-
sumptions is no accident. The microfoundations of
economic theory are seen as being approximately
true rather than as only partially true. The notion
of modeling as approximation however, disguises
the value judgements hidden behind the decision to
count some phenomena as more important than
others.” (Strassmann, 1993).
If Samuelson decided to follow the hints mentioned
abo , he would have had to allow unorthodox and
unwanted economic truths, namely that the reproduc-
tivity of human mothers allows positive interest rates
and that incident causes an increase of well being for
part of the population – contradicting assumption A8.
But then he would have had to conclude that child-
birth must have some kind of value (this principle
will be discussed in the next section) instead of taking
it for granted and not valuing it at all. These contra-
dicting issues associated with a monetary valuing
7system lead to even more questions: Does money
really create socially optimal outcomes for all indi-
viduals (either existing implicitly or outspokenly
within the modeled world)? Why does economic the-
ory deny the importance of women’s work? Does this
denial mirror the subjectivity and real political inter-
ests of economic theory? Is the discrimination faced
by women and by people who are non-white and/or
members of “lower social classes” a consequence of
concepts like Samuelson’s contribution to Neo-
classical theory? Some of these questions will be
answered in what follows.
4.    MONETARY UNITS AND THEIR VALUE
4.1  MONEY AS A SOCIAL CONTRIVANCE TO ENSURE
SOCIAL OPTIMALITY
The third outcome of Samuelson’s analysis is “to ee
one “function” of money from a new slant – as a
social compact that can provide optimal old age
social security.” (Samuelson, 1958). Indeed, money
serves as a deposit of goods’ values, as an instrument
to shift individual saving from productive periods to
non-productive (future) periods, and, consequently, as
a medium to guarantee consumption in retirement.
Economists love to tell stories about the origins of
money in different cultures. Kauri shells, stone-
wheels, elephants’ tails, pressed tea, or dogs’ teeth,
are curious examples of prehistoric currencies. These
paradigms are often used to make us believe that
every advanced culture is obliged to invent money to
store wealth. But what is the nature of the “values”
which need to be preserved and stored for the future?
While women perform “non-monetary” (actually non-
measurable) activities like reproduction work, child-
care, taking care of the sick and old, household work,
work on the family’s fields, etc. for free, other (meas-
urable) values become non-perishable as monetary
units. Money seems to be an invention by men to
preserve values for men. Symptomatically, the inven-
tion of money pops up in Samuelson’s model, when
we try to answer the question of how to preserve
men’s production (of goods) for their old age.
These observations are consistent with women’s
experiences having to face (a lot of) money. For men
the ownership of money clearly means independence,
for women it often indicates an ambivalent situation:
Historically, women’s access to money was via men.
Receiving money was never associated with a deal of
neutral nature; the interpersonal relationships accom-
panying monetary transfers were (and are) usually
quite complicated. The husband provides physical
things and money to satisfy the family’s needs, in
return the wife produces children and emotional sup-
port and other monetarily invaluable deeds. The diffi-
culty to measure the wife’s performance in monetary
units leads to arbitrary rewards for her duties. On the
labor market the rewards (i.e. wages) are less arbi-
trary. The field of responsibility of the woman worker
is still somewhat blurred. Bosses often feel they have
a right to special services of their female employees –
just think about the coffee ritual. Sexual harassment
at the working place is partly resulting from tradi-
tio ally far-reaching boundaries for women’s working
domains. Hence, for women money often creates
dependence instead of the desirable independence.
The creation of money to preserve typically male
values in a men’s world is an androcentric tool to
maintain power.
4.2   VALUES
Both the use of the technique of mathematical mod-
eling and the invention of money allow to combine
and to measure groups of durable and non-durable
goods (which have different values) over time, how-
ever,
“One of the great metaphysical ideas in eco-
nomics is expressed by the word “value”.  ... It
does not mean market prices, which vary from
time to time under the influence of casual acci-
dents; nor is it just an historical average of ac-
tual prices. Indeed, it is not simply a price; it is
something which will explain, how prices come to
be what they are. What is it? Where shall we find
it? Like all metaphysical concepts, when you try
to pin it down it turns out to be just a word.”
(Robinson, 1979)
Most crucial is the very basic assumption A15. Goods
which are rare are most valuable: e.g. gold charms.
Others which are easily available are of less value:
e.g. bricks. The usefulness of those rare items com-
pared to widespread articles does not influence the
evaluation process. With regard to services, Adam
Smith was the first economist to connect moral values
to market values. In doing so he scientifically founded
the arrangement that men’s doings are valuable and
non-altruistic and therefore need to be paid for, while
women’s doings are nothing of that sort. In the free
market the homo oeconomicus is operating as fol-
lows:
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
br wer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest.” (Adam
S ith, 1778).
The wife’s provision of a dinner is not so clearly
founded on her own interest. Altruistic motives and
emotional ties are believed to be the driving force of
interactions in the family. Not only women, but also
men are in this context unselfishly straining to make
each others´ and their children’s lives more happy:
“Becker refers to the altruistic head [of the family]
as mal  and to the beneficiaries as women and
children, although he claims that he used masculine
8and feminine pronouns only to distinguish the al-
truist from the beneficiary. Since Becker certainly
knows that it is generally men who have greater ac-
cess to money, we must be suspicious of his claim
that his choice of the male pronoun to denote the
altruist was arbitrary. Yet Becker never discusses
the effects of such differential power in the family.
[...] It is particularly ironic that altruism, in which
women seem to specialize more than men, gets
credited to men!” (England, 1993).
As mentioned above, goods and services like birth of
a child and motherhood, childcare, emotional sup-
port, relief of aged people, etc. can hardly be meas-
ured in monetary units because these goods are not
produced and purchased in a free market. Since
women traditionally (re)produce in their families,
most of their deeds – whether regarded as valuable or
not – are performed (altruistically) without orienta-
tion on compensation. But remembering the connec-
tion of value to scarcity it would be interesting to find
out if reproduction work became more valuable if
performed less frequently.
According to Marilyn Waring (1988) all our beliefs of
value are strongly influenced by androcentric bias.
Assigning a certain value to an economic action is
independent of the actual time or energy invested, but
solely dependent on who performs the deed. The
value of a service or good is determined by an exoge-
nous instance and related to an abstract monetary
value. Patriarchal ranking of values is solely con-
nected to money and based on more or less arbitrary
cultural and androcentric standards. The implications
for the real life of women and people from non-white
and/or lower-class backgrounds are aggravating.
“Economic approaches and policies are rooted in a
problematic, and often deadly, dichotomization of
what does and does not have value.” (Waring,
1988)
The justification of androcentric valuing in economics
evolves around the idea of a well-meaning monetary
system.10 Samuelson’s 1958 paper also takes this
point of view. The insight that money creates pa to-
efficient optimal conditions seems convincing, until
we look more closely at the hidden agenda. Actually,
Donald McCloskey believes that
“after the masculinist programs of Paul Samuelson
[...] we know more about economic models lacking
contact with the world.” (McCloskey, 1993) .
                                         
10 The ambivalence of money creating optimal welfare
conditions on the one hand and an utterly ruthless homo
oeconomicus who uses money to cheat others and to live on
their expense on the other hand is reflected in Lucas and
Stokey (1987).
However not the lack of contact, but the dramatic
influence of such programs on the real world and
their strategy to maintain the status quo is crucial.
Economists systematically omit information about
women and their spheres of life to emphasize the
importance of male interests. To give up this strategy
would also mean to give up male privileges in real
life.
5.   GENETIC ALGORITHMS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE MODELING APPROACH TO
CONSIDER NOWADAYS SOCIETY?
A possible way to overcome the troublesome  “repre-
sentative agent” assumption, A1, (and also the neo-
Walrasian concept of a general competitive equilib-
rium expressed by assumption A9), is the use of
Computational Intelligence (CI) techniques like neu-
ral networks, genetic algorithms and/or cellular
automata. All of these approaches from computer
sciences are used lately to describe the adaptive be-
havior of heterogeneous individuals in economic
systems, see e.g. the survey in (Dawid, 1999a). CI
techniques do not yield analytical results, but the
numerical results obtained allow to suggest features of
the model, to examine the transient behavior of eco-
nomic systems before they settle down in an equilib-
rium, and to investigate features of social learning
like imitation and communication effects which can-
not be dealt with in a representative agent model, as
performed in e.g. Behrens and Dawid (2000) – and
this “heterogeneous agents” approach is absolutely
necessary considering nowadays family demography.
E.g. ÖSTAT (1998) reports that a marriage lasts on
average approximately 8-9 years due to a divorce rate
of about  38%. The associated increase in the number
of single-parent families manifests the flaws of the
1958 OLG model or any of its extensions including
assumption A1.
To illustrate the whole variety of the characteristic
features of a heterogeneous society we refer to the use
of Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based models,11 s e e.g.
Goldberg (1989) or Dawid (1999a). The idea to use
Genetic Algorithms to capture the basic features of
OLG models is not new in economic theory. Azari-
adis (1981) and other authors show that in OLG
models rational expectations equilibria with random
                                         
11 Genetic Algorithms may be treated as models of adaptive
behavior in a population of boundedly rational individuals
and were recently used to examine adaptive behavior in
several economic models, e.g. Andreoni and Miller (1995),
Arifovic (1994, 1995, 1996), Dawid (1999b), Dawid and
Kopel (1998), Marimon et al. (1990), especially, because in
several of these contributions, e.g. Arifovic (1994, 1995), it
i  s wn that Genetic Algorithms are well-suited tools to
describe actual human learning behavior and match ex-
perime tal results often better than standard learning rules,
like least-square learning or stochastic approximation.
9prices12 may exist though there is no uncertainty
within the model. Arifovic (1995) uses GAs to learn
stationary equilibria with perfect foresight in a simple
OLG model. She extends her analysis to the case of a
two-country OLG model in Arifovic (1996). Dawid
(1996) shows that a simple OLG model with fiat
money is able to learn sunspots and even cycles. Bul-
lard and Duffy (1998) deal with a n-period OLG
model where the agents’ adaptive learning is again
modeled by GAs. We argue that it might be very
fruitful to follow this line of investigation combined
with Becker’s (1992) “Economy and Fertility” ap-
proach, and set up a “D wid-type” OLG model (see
Dawid, 1996), but differentiate between populations
of opposite genders. In spite of the GA-based exten-
sions of the standard OLG model which are listed
above, to our knowledge, no two-gender approach
exists. We argue that this is a consequence of the
enormous difficulty associated with the so-called
encoding mechanism – without destroying the “con-
vergence” behavior of the GA.13
We argue that a model which captures the basic
features of overlapping generations in nowadays soci-
ety has to include at least two populations, namely,
· a population of type M individuals whose produc-
tivity phase lasts from their, say, 20th to their 65th
“birthday” without being interrupted by a repro-
duction phase, followed by a retirement phase as
described by e.g. Samuelson (1958), and
· a population of type F individuals who are able to
decide whether to “reproduce or to produce”
where children are assumed to be part of their
consumption. But in case of reproduction these
individuals have to be – for a while (or for the rest
of their lives) – part of the consumption of “some-
body else”. This immediately raises the well-
known question: Who is somebody else?
In a number of cases this could be a partner,
say a type M individual. But who is going to pro-
vide consumption for an average type F individual
during the reproduction phase in the remaining
number of cases? Certainly, we cannot use Sa-
muelson’s principle of the interest rate (“You g t
something, because you once gave something”) to
guarantee consumption during the reproduction
phase. If we use the “trading” principle of give
and receive we have to face the well-know prob-
                                         
12 These equilibria, which are governed by the beliefs of the
individuals that an external random variable has some
influence on the prices, are called sunspots.
13 Though, strictly speaking, GAs never converge if the
mutation rate is positive, we will use the term “conve-
gence” to outline a state, where one strategy spreads over
the entire groups (of both genders), and the only fluctua-
tions within the populations are due to mutations.
lem: What is the value of a child’s birth, and what
is the value of raising that child?
We have to find a monetary equivalent which
can be used as an equalization payment (from so-
ciety) to finance consumption during the repro-
duction phase to guarantee that type F individuals
are in a position which allows a rational counter-
balance between production and reproduction.
This may be accomplished as follows: Contra-
dicting assumption A8, the reproductivity of hu-
man mothers allows positive interest rates which
causes an increase of well-being for part of the
population, namely the women having and raising
a child.
Figure 2: Structure of a Simple Genetic Algorithm
Then, the modeling approach proceeds as follows:
Each single agent in the GA-based OLG model (i.e.
each member of one of the populations) is represented
by a binary string of predetermined length. The cod-
ing mechanism for the populations of type M and type
F individuals, respectively, could work as follows.
¨ Consider a binary string, bi, of length, lM, in the
population of type M individuals. Interpret the
first, say, 8 bits of this binary string as the repre-
sentation of an integer, h, in the binary alphabet.
This value represents individual i’s consumption,
e.g. the string, 01010100, describes an individual
with a consumption of 84 units. This value
should, however, be normalized, e.g. by dividing
this integer by 2lM-1, which gives a value in the
unit interval, (0,1). Additional bits might reflect
information about the age, the family status in-
cluding martial status, the number of children,
etc.
· Strings in the population of type F individuals are
of length lF> lF. The first parts of their strings may
begin
selection
crossover
mutation
uniform?
end
y
n
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be designed equivalently to the strings in the type
M population, but the rest should include more
information about children and, particularly, the
time devoted to bringing them up, the corre-
sponding working status, the income level, etc.
These artificially intelligent agents have much higher
computational capabilities than the traditional eco-
nomic agents who react exactly to the predetermined
rules according to the economic model. In each pe-
riod each artificially intelligent agent receives some
payoff for his/her choice of consumption, which de-
fines the so-called fitness value. (These values depend
on the situation of the artificial agents with respect to
their ages and their family circumstances.) Using
these fitness values the transition from one generation
to the succeeding one is executed by the application of
the GA Operators which are described in detail by
e.g. Dawid (1999a). This application, visualized by
Figure 2, is affected separately for each population.
The Selection Operator models an imitation effect
within a population. Individuals with low payoffs will
very likely imitate those with high payoffs.14 Within a
single population, individuals will be influenced by
others, even if they do not imitate each one. The
whole – or only notions of their – strategy are
adopted. This is accomplished by the Crossover Op-
erator and gives strings with high fitness a chance to
produce even better individuals. The Mutation Op-
erator models some kind of innovation: Either actions
are randomly mistaken, or the agents think that the
best strategy has not yet been found. Thus, with very
small probability, strings come into existence, which
can not be found in the initial generation. This proce-
dure will be repeated until all strings are equal, (or a
predetermined number of iteration steps is reached).
The resulting uniform populations hopefully out-
line the equilibrium features of a heterogeneous soci-
ety consisting of overlapping generations of opposite
gender coming close to real-world human behavior.
                                         
14 In the setup presented here, the fitness of a string in
either of the populations depends on the values of other
strings in both populations. Such a situation, which is
rather usual in economic models and quite different from
the standard applications where GAs are used to solve
static optimization problems, was analyzed by Dawid
(1994, 1999a) and Dawid and Hornik (1996). They refer to
such kinds of models as “GAs with states dependent fitness
functions” and show how possible outcomes of simulations
in such models are characterized. In particular, they show
that a population state, which is the result of a GA simul-
tion, is not necessarily an equilibrium of the underlying
economic system, and they describe the possible impact of
variations in implementation details (like the coding
scheme, the crossover probability or fitness re-scaling).
Taking these findings into account, we keep in mind to be
very careful when interpreting the results in economic
terms.
6.   CONCLUDING REMARKS
Economists systematically omit information about
women and their spheres of life to emphasize the
importance of male interests in economic theory.
Theories like the one developed in Samuelson’s OLG
model is used scientifically to strengthen the privi-
leged position of men in society. The androcentrically
biased assigning of monetary values to certain actions
and goods but not to others is a core strategy in that
regard.
Samuelson’s OLG model creates the typical Neo-
classical world seen from the perspective of a white,
male economist in the late 1950ies. To illustrate the
accusation of subjectivity in this paper, try to imagine
how "the female African economist Paula Samuelson"
would try to model the problems of retirement (from
her point of view). Do you think she would have come
up with the same modeled world as Paul Samuelson?
Trying to be innovative in our critique of the OLG
model, we briefly outline an alternative modeling
approach based on the use of Genetic Algorithms. In
doing so, we follow the basic model setup of Dawid
(1996) but extend the model assumption to consider
two populations of artificially intelligent agents of
different gender.
As a different approach which avoids the andro-
centrically biased assigning of monetary values en-
tirely, Marilyn Waring advocates the use of time
rather than the use of money as a more adequate and
equitable standard to measure the value of productive
activities (Waring, 1988). But not to find a concept
for change is most problematic. To give up andro-
centric strategies also means to give up male privi-
leges in real life, therefore a strong denial of bias or
subjectivity usually arises when the injustices sup-
ported by economic theory are pointed out.
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